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RESTRICTION OF TORT REMEDIES AND THE 
CONSTRAINTS OF DUE PROCESS: THE RIGHT TO AN 
ADEQUATE REMEDY 
Tracy A. Thomas* 
In the recent proliferation of tort reform statutes, the dangerous 
clause of remedial jurisdiction stripping has sneaked into the law.  
Reminiscent of federal statutes in other areas of the law,1 these 
jurisdictional provisions strip courts of all power to award punitive or 
non-pecuniary damages in excess of legislative limits.2  Many states 
have acted to restrict frivolous claims and excessive recoveries by 
cabining “McTorts” and “runaway juries.”3  Regardless of the merits of 
these policy questions, the use of the simple expedient of remedial 
jurisdiction to accomplish these purposes raises significant concerns.  By 
arbitrarily restricting an individual’s right to a meaningful remedy, the 
tort reform remedy restrictions threaten to dilute common-law rights.  
The systemic problems of restricting remedies through arbitrary state 
action have concerned me in the past,4 and they are brought to the 
 
* Professor of Law, University of Akron.  A special thanks to the participants in the 2005 Remedies 
Forum for their insightful comments and reactions to this paper, and to Sarah Cravens and Stewart 
Moritz for their valuable input on the article. 
 1. See infra notes 21-25 and accompanying text. 
 2. See OHIO REV. CODE § 2305.01 (2005) (“The court of common pleas shall not have 
jurisdiction, in any tort action to which the amounts set forth apply, to award punitive or exemplary 
damages that exceed [two times compensatories to a maximum of $350,000].”); id. §§ 2305.01 & 
2315.18(E)(1) (limiting jurisdiction in tort action to award compensatory damages for non-
economic loss in excess of $250,000 or three times economic loss up to $500,000).  Ohio adopted 
the same jurisdiction stripping provision in its 1999 tort reform laws that were struck down in the 
Sheward case.  Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999). 
 3. The poster children of tort reform have been the media images of unrestrained “runaway” 
juries and frivolous lawsuits against McDonald’s for hot coffee and high-fat foods.   See, e.g.,  Alex 
Berenson, Vioxx Jury Adds More in Damages, N.Y. TIMES, April 12, 2006, at C1; Editorial, It’s 
Lawyers’ Own Fault, SAN ANT. EXPRESS-NEWS, Dec. 23, 2005, at 6B (“[I]f lawyers’ greed and 
liberal juries had not resulted in such ridiculously extravagant awards (i.e. the McDonald’s hot 
coffee spill multimillion-dollar award), tort reform would not have been necessary.”); Howard 
Wasserman, Fast Food Justice: Infamous Cases Involving French Fries, Obesity, Too-Hot Coffee, 
and Fingertips  (Oct. 6, 2005), available at http://www.findlaw.com/commentary . 
 4. See Tracy A. Thomas, Ubi Jus, Ibi Remedium: The Fundamental Right to a Remedy 
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forefront again with the advent of the latest generation of tort reform. 
The legislative action of tort reform remedy stripping exhibits a 
misuse of jurisdictional defining power.  Using remedial jurisdiction to 
control rights is arguably a convenient, politically acceptable way to 
legislate disfavored rights.5  Such jurisdiction stripping at the federal 
level has been used to attack remedies for desegregation, prisoners’ civil 
rights, and habeas corpus.6  Its use as a legal maneuver is often 
accompanied by little political fallout: for it seems politically expedient 
to stop excessive payouts to prisoners (but not eliminate civil rights),7 
and protect health insurance (but not immunize doctors).8  After all, 
everyone knows coffee is hot, prisoners don’t live in hotels, and doctors 
help people.  However, avoiding direct legislation upon these 
substantive issues by sneaking in through the back door of remedies is 
formalistically dishonest and insulates representatives from the political 
accountability that should follow as a consequence of legislative action 
in a democracy. 
The pretextual use of jurisdiction to restrict remedies has serious 
implications both within and outside of the tort reform context.  The 
maneuver exceeds the purpose and intent of the legislative power to 
define and organize the judiciary.  Such a violation of the spirit of 
jurisdictional authority converts the legislature’s power to define the 
jurisdiction of the courts into a plenary power to regulate, or eviscerate, 
all remedies and legal rights.  This unrestrained legislative power has 
been challenged in the past as a violation of separation of powers.9  In 
 
Under Due Process, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1633 (2004) (arguing that judicial denial of an adequate 
remedy violates due process) [hereinafter Thomas, Ubi Jus]; Tracy A. Thomas, Congress’ Section 5 
Power and Remedial Rights, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 673 (2001) (arguing that Congress’ restriction 
of remedies under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides inadequate redress which 
dilutes the individual’s constitutional right) [hereinafter Thomas, Remedial Rights]. 
 5. David Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights and Restricted 
Remedies, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1242 (2005) (“Targeting groups without political power or 
support, Congress imposed wide-ranging limitations” on civil rights remedies.  “There is a sad irony 
in the fact that Congress (and the courts . . . ) have selectively limited rights for these ‘discrete and 
insular minorities.’”). 
 6. See infra notes 21-25 and accompanying text; see Lloyd Anderson, Congressional 
Control Over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: The New Threat to James Madison’s 
Compromise, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 417 (2000) (discussing the many historical and modern attempts by 
Congress to restrict federal court jurisdiction). 
 7. John Boston, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: The New Face of Court Stripping, 67 
BROOK. L. REV. 429, 437 n.23 (2001) (noting that the sparse legislative history of the PLRA 
consisted mainly of rhetorical assertions about the need for criminals to do “hard time,” prisoners 
“churning out lawsuits with no regard to cost or merit,” and frivolous prisoner lawsuits over melted 
ice cream and the wrong brand of sneakers). 
 8. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.43 (2005) (Statement of Findings and Intent). 
 9. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1094-95 (Ohio 1999); 
Theodore J. Weiman, Comment, Jurisdiction Stripping, Constitutional Supremacy and the 
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response, legislatures have tried to circumvent these structural barriers 
by using their jurisdictional power to shackle the judiciary’s ability to 
act. 
This article identifies another counterbalancing power that checks 
the legislative ability to restrict tort remedies through tort reform: the 
due process clauses of both state and federal constitutions.  Pursuing this 
uncharted line of inquiry, this article argues that due process guarantees 
provide a restraint on the tort remedy stripping provisions that deny 
plaintiffs their fundamental right to a meaningful remedy.  Building 
upon prior work asserting the fundamentality of the right to a remedy,10 
this article develops the correlative due process protection  mandating 
heightened review of legislation that burdens or denies the remedial 
right.  This constitutional scrutiny is necessary to hold the legislature 
accountable to constitutional commands and to provide the necessary 
transparency and respect for the rule of law. 
Pulling together the disparate strands of legal rules in existing case 
law, the article develops a cohesive theory of due process protection for 
the right to an adequate remedy.  State court decisions invalidating tort 
reform remedy restrictions appear analytically scattered and based upon 
seemingly narrow doctrinal rules of “quid pro quo,” “due course of law,” 
or access to the courts.11  However, upon closer consideration, these 
cases reveal a common theoretical foundation emanating from due 
process.12  When these decisions are compared to U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions spanning the twentieth century, the right to an adequate and 
meaningful judicial remedy emerges even more clearly.13  Locating this 
due process requirement of an adequate remedy significantly alters the 
way in which courts currently assess the legality of tort reform 
legislation.  Such a heightened standard does not necessarily sound the 
death knell for tort reform, but it does demand a more substantial basis 
for restricting remedies, and it averts the political obfuscation of the 
significant remedial issues dominating tort reform today. 
I.  JURISDICTION BY ANY OTHER NAME, IS STILL JURISDICTION? 
It should come as no surprise that state legislatures are using 
 
Implications of Ex Parte Young, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1677 (2005); Robert S. Peck, Tort Reform’s 
Threat to an Independent Judiciary, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 835 (2002); Matthew W. Light, Note, Who’s 
the Boss? Statutory Damage Caps, Courts, and State Constitutional Law, 58 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 
315, 316 (2001). 
 10. See Thomas, Ubi Jus, supra note 4; see also infra notes 58-65 and accompanying text. 
 11. See Light, supra note 9. 
 12. See infra notes 84-94 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra notes 96-118 and accompanying text. 
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jurisdiction-stripping measures to curtail the power of the courts to 
award tort remedies.  The interbranch tension over tort reform remedies 
is nothing new.  As Professor Janutis discusses in her article, political 
powers have been fighting since the early nineteenth century over 
legislative restriction of judicial remedies.14  In recent time, the judiciary 
and legislature in Ohio have gone round and round for the last two 
decades as the courts have repeatedly struck down tort reform statutes 
and judicial careers have been made and lost on the issue.15  Tired of 
polite requests to the judiciary to “reconsider its holding,” the lawmakers 
have resorted to the legislative death penalty of jurisdiction stripping to 
deprive the courts of any possible ability to ignore the legislative 
mandates. 16 
The use of a jurisdiction stripping provision rather than a remedial 
restriction clearly signals the legislative intent for an absolute 
prohibition on certain damages.  The use of the structural tool prohibits 
any reasoned exception or deviation from the caps, such as those 
sometimes seen in civil rights cases.17  The jurisdictional provision 
encourages collateral attacks for any damages award in excess of the 
cap, thereby weakening the interstate viability of state judgments.  In 
short, the jurisdictional weapon silences the legislative/judicial dialogue 
over tort remedies by shutting down one side of the discussion. 
This structural attempt to silence the judiciary’s influence over law 
where legislative and judicial policies differ is also seen at the federal 
level.18  Conventional wisdom has held that Congress rarely, if ever, 
 
 14. Rachel M. Janutis, The Struggle Over Tort Reform and the Overlooked Legacy of the 
Progressives and Populists, 39 AKRON L. REV. (2007); see also John Nockleby & Shannon Currier, 
100 Years of Conflict: The Past and Future of Tort Retrenchment, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1021 
(2005). 
 15. Michael Scherer, State Judges for Sale, THE NATION, Sept. 2, 2002 (discussing how Ohio 
Justice Alice Robie Resnick was targeted in the 2000 election because of her majority opinion in the 
4-3 Sheward decision invalidating tort reform a second time); see also Jim Copland, Turning Out 
Trial Lawyers, etc., NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Nov. 2004), available at http://www.nationalreview.com 
(“Tort reformers also scored big wins Tuesday in state judicial races. Judicial elections are a key 
component of litigation reform: Not only do judges make decisions on litigation, but ‘creative’ 
judges in many states have struck down tort-reform laws passed by state legislatures.”). 
 16. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.43 (2005) (Statement of Legislative Intent) (“The Ohio 
General Assembly respectfully requests that the Ohio Supreme Court . . . reconsider its holding on 
damage caps in State v. Sheward (1999).”); Stephen J. Werber, Ohio: A Microcosm of Tort Reform 
Versus State Constitutional Mandates, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 1045, 1065 (2001) (“The [tort reform] 
picture was completed by an amendment declaring that the Ohio Court of Common Pleas had no 
jurisdiction to award compensation for non-economic loss. . . .  Talk about chutzpah!”). 
 17. See Caprice L. Roberts, Ratios, (Ir)rationality, and Civil Rights Punitive Damages, 39 
AKRON L. REV. (2006). 
 18. See, e.g., Caprice L. Roberts, Jurisdiction Stripping in Three Acts: “Three String 
Serenade”, 51 VILL. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2006), available at http://www.ssrn.com; Anderson, 
supra note 6, at 419, 434 (“It should be emphasized that the issue of congressional control over 
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restricts federal court jurisdiction, though it often threatens and postures 
such action.19  However, a recent empirical study challenges this 
accepted notion, and establishes, to the contrary, that Congress regularly, 
and with increasing frequency, strips jurisdiction from the federal 
courts.20  Indeed, the structural weapon of jurisdiction stripping has been 
used to attack unpopular injunctive remedies involving unions, abortion, 
desegregation, immigration, and prisons.21  During the height of the 
school desegregation cases, President Nixon made several proposals to 
Congress to enact bans on court busing orders.22  Congress has restricted 
the courts’ jurisdiction to order the habeas corpus remedy,23 and most 
recently acted to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear 
constitutional challenges related to the Guantanamo Bay detentions.24  In 
prison conditions cases, Congress proposed in the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 to strip the federal courts of all power to award 
structural injunctions; however, it ultimately enacted more narrow 
qualifications for such injunctions in response to expressed 
 
jurisdiction only arises in any significant way when Congress disagrees with judicial decisions. 
When Congress is content with such decisions, it has no reason to launch serious attacks on the 
power of the courts.”); Neil A. Lewis, Dismissal of Guantanamo Suits Sought, INT’L HERALD TRIB., 
Jan. 5, 2006, at 2 (noting that Congress acted to strip courts of jurisdiction to award habeas corpus 
remedy for Guantanamo Bay detentions to counter the June 2004 decision of the U.S. Supreme 
Court authorizing such relief).  But see Dawn M. Chutkow, Jurisdiction Stripping: Ideology, 
Institutional Concerns, and Congressional Control of the Court (Oct. 19, 2005), available at 
http://www.ssrn.com (suggesting that Congress acts to remove jurisdiction for administrative 
concerns such as reducing federal court caseloads). 
 19. Anderson, supra note 6, at 418; Chutkow, supra note 18, at 4. 
 20. Chutkow, supra note 18, at 4 & n.6. 
 21. See, e.g., Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 329-30 (1938) (upholding the Norris-
LaGuardia Act and Congress’ power to limit the jurisdiction of the federal court by constraining the 
court’s power to issue injunctions in labor cases); see Anderson, supra note 6, at 418 nn.6-7 (citing 
examples of jurisdiction-stripping power used to prohibit certain injunctive remedies); Stephan O. 
Kline, Judicial Independence: Rebuffing Attacks on the Third Branch, 87 KY. L. J. 679, 730-40 
(1999) (detailing remedial-stripping enactments of the early 1990s). 
 22. See Ronald D. Rotunda, Congressional Power to Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Lower 
Federal Courts and the Problem of School Busing, 64 GEO. L.J. 839 (1976).  See also H.R. 3332, 
97th Cong. (1981) (forbidding any federal court from requiring student attendance at school based 
on race); H.R. 5200, 97th Cong. (1981) (limiting the authority of federal courts to order student 
transportation or to alter local tax rates in school desegregation cases). 
 23. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996) (upholding provision eliminating appellate 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court for all “second or successive” habeas petitions); David Cole, 
Jurisdiction and Liberty: Habeas Corpus and Due Process as Limits on Congress’ Control of 
Federal Jurisdiction, 86 GEO. L.J. 2481 (1998). 
 24. S. 1042, 108th Cong. (Nov. 10, 2005) (stripping federal courts of jurisdiction to issue 
habeas corpus remedy for constitutional challenges related to the Guantanamo detention); Neil A. 
Lewis, U.S. to Seek Dismissal of Guantanamo Suits, N.Y. TIMES, at A11 (Jan. 4, 2006) (reporting 
that remedy stripping provision regarding Guantanamo detentions became law as part of the 2006 
defense appropriations bill). 
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constitutional concerns.25  Given this context, it is not surprising that 
legislatures considering tort reform resort to the use of this powerful, and 
increasingly common, jurisdictional weapon. 
However, simply because legislators have crafted the remedy 
stripping provisions of tort reform laws in terms of “jurisdiction” does 
not necessarily make them jurisdictional.  Morphing legal restrictions on 
remedies into the shape of jurisdiction raises both formalistic and 
structural concerns.26  At the formalistic level, calling law jurisdictional 
when it is not confuses and perhaps masks the operation of the law.27  At 
the structural level, the misuse of jurisdictional power threatens to 
expand the limited legislative power to organize the courts into an all-
encompassing power to do whatever the legislature pleases. 
Legislatures generally designate court jurisdiction.28  State courts, 
like inferior federal courts, are limited to the jurisdiction that the 
legislature may choose to bestow.29  As the Ohio Supreme Court held 
almost one-hundred years ago, with respect to jurisdiction, “[t]he 
legislative judgment in this behalf will not be nullified except when it 
clearly appears that there has been a gross abuse of such discretion in 
undoubted violation of some state or federal constitutional provision.”30 
Jurisdiction is the designation of the court’s initial authority to hear 
a case in the first instance.31  As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Davis 
 
 25. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A); 142 CONG. REC. S2285-02 at S2297 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996) 
(statement of Associate Attorney General John Schmidt before the Senate Judiciary Committee 
testifying that the proposed legislative restrictions on remedies “would raise serious constitutional 
problems” under due process and separation of powers).  See Theodore K. Cheng, Invading an 
Article III Court’s Inherent Equitable Powers: Separation of Powers and the Immediate 
Termination Provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 969, 981 
(1999). 
 26. See Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV. 643 (2005) 
(arguing that confusing jurisdiction with merits determinations in statutory analysis raises 
procedural and formalistic concerns). 
 27. Cf. id. at 656 (making similar argument where factual issues going to the merits are 
characterized as threshold questions of “jurisdiction”).   
 28. See, e.g., OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 4(B); VA. CONST. art. VI, § 1.  See Humphreys v. 
Putnam, 178 N.E.2d 506, 509 (Ohio 1961); Finley v. Pfeiffer, 126 N.E.2d 57, 61 (Ohio 1955). 
 29. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999); MARTIN H. 
REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 83 (2d ed. 
1990); Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword, Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to 
Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 25 (1980) (“Courts and 
commentators agree that Congress’ discretion in granting jurisdiction to the lower federal courts 
implies that those courts take jurisdiction from Congress and not from article III.”). 
 30. Williams v. Scudder, 131 N.E. 481 (Ohio 1921); accord Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 456 (“It 
is well established that legislation cannot contravene the Constitution.”); Dayton v. State, 813 N.E. 
2d 707, 728 (Ohio App. 2004) (citing Scancarello v. Erie Ins. Co., 1996 WL 421858, 3 (1996)) 
(commenting that under Ohio’s “system of checks and balances, the judiciary retains the power to 
nullify legislative decisions if they violate a state or federal constitutional provision.”). 
 31. Wasserman, supra note 26, at 650. 
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v. Passman, “jurisdiction” is whether a federal court has the 
constitutional or statutory power to hear a case.32  Professor Howard 
Wasserman has explained in some detail how jurisdiction operates as a 
threshold question a court must resolve before it may proceed to hear the 
case.33  The question of remedy is a separate one determining, at the end 
of the case,  whether there is a basis to award the litigant some specified 
relief for the established violation of a legal right.34  “[T]he Court has 
largely maintained a clear analytic distinction between jurisdiction, on 
the one hand, and two other necessary components of a federal-court 
lawsuit: a cognizable cause of action and the availability of an 
appropriate judicial remedy.”35 
Two recent Supreme Court cases support the precise analytical use 
of the terminology and power of “jurisdiction.”36  In Eberhart v. United 
States37 and Kontrick v. Ryan,38 the Court held that statutory time limits 
for requesting a new trial are not “jurisdictional,” but rather “claim-
processing rules” that are mandatory procedure rules, which do not 
implicate a court’s power to hear a case.  The Court cautioned that the 
imprecise use of the word “jurisdiction” has obscured the central 
understandings of the operative rules.39  Despite some lack of clarity in 
the past, the Court has now signaled its intent to use the term 
“jurisdiction” carefully to mean only those “prescriptions delineating the 
classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal 
jurisdiction) falling within a court’s adjudicatory authority.”40 
“Jurisdiction” by definition then is not a decision on the merits of a 
case.41  Jurisdiction is a predicate to judicial action; it does not operate at 
the end of the case as a result or decision of the court.42  Thus, 
 
 32. 442 U.S. 228 (1979); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 33. Wasserman, supra note 26, at 651. 
 34. Donald H. Zeigler, Rights, Rights of Action, and Remedies: An Integrated Approach, 76 
WASH. L. REV. 67 (2001). 
 35. Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1207, 1214 (2001); 
see also Zeigler, supra note 34. 
 36. Credit goes to Michael Allen for this point.  
 37. 126 S. Ct. 403 (2005) (holding that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(a) setting forth 
time limits for a defendant’s motion for a new trial is not “jurisdictional”). 
 38. 540 U.S. 443 (2004) (holding that defenses made available by time limitations in the 
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure are not “jurisdictional”). 
 39. Eberhart, 126 S.Ct. at 406. 
 40. Id. at 405; Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455. 
 41. Wasserman, supra note 26, at 650. 
 42. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 128, 146-48 (1872).  In Klein, the Court 
invalidated a congressional jurisdictional statute that directed a rule of decision on the merits of 
post-Civil War forfeitures.  Id. The Court found that the statute did not operate to organize claims in 
the normal jurisdictional fashion, but instead required the Court to reach a particular decision. “But 
the court is forbidden to give the effect to evidence which, in its own judgment, such evidence 
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formalistically, what the tort reform statutes are doing by restricting a 
factual decision about damages at the end of a case is simply not 
“jurisdiction.”  “The power of the court to hear and decide a case could 
hardly be made to depend upon the jury’s verdict.”43  Misusing 
“jurisdiction” raises concerns of positive law by mixing distinct legal 
questions, thus adding to the confusion of the legitimacy of such 
action.44 
Fundamentally, jurisdiction is a rule of organization, not 
decisionmaking.  It exists for the purpose of organizing the courts by 
subject matter in order to streamline cases and develop the expertise of 
the courts.  Thus, state legislatures commonly designate domestic 
relations courts, juvenile courts, and small claims courts to direct the 
stream of cases and develop expertise in the judges.45  Jurisdiction thus 
serves a channeling function to direct the flow of cases to the proper 
decisionmaking body. 
The channeling function of jurisdiction is further illustrated by the 
bases for federal jurisdiction.  Claims can be brought in federal court 
when a federal question is raised or when there is a diversity of 
citizenship between the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds a 
designated sum.46  The normal result of these jurisdictional statutes is 
that some claims will be channeled into federal court, while the 
remaining claims will be adjudicated in state courts.47  As long as there 
is access to some court for an important constitutional claim, “much of 
our concern about legislation denying access to federal courts must 
inevitably seem overblown.”48  Jurisdiction thus directs the litigation 
traffic to the most appropriate court. 
It is questionable whether the tort reform jurisdictional statutes are 
 
should have, and is directed to give it an effect precisely contrary.”  Id. at 147.  See Gordon G. 
Young, A Critical Reassessment of the Case Law Bearing on Congress’s Power to Restrict the 
Jurisdiction of the Lower Federal Courts, 54 MD. L. REV. 132, 157 (1995) (stating that Klein 
involved “puppeteering” rather than “court-stripping” as the Court was given, not denied, 
jurisdiction to act, and that jurisdiction was shaped to control the decision on the merits). 
 43. Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal “Question” in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 
166 (1953). 
 44. Wasserman, supra note 26, at 669-78. 
 45. E.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-273. 
 46. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). 
 47. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141, 1215 
(1988). 
 48. Louise Weinberg, The Article III Box: The Power of Congress to Attack the Jurisdiction 
of Federal Courts, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1405, 1410 (2000); Martin Redish, Constitutional Limitations 
on Congressional Power to Control Jurisdiction: A Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 
143, 156 (1982) (arguing that restricting federal court jurisdiction to issue remedies is not 
problematic as long as the state courts remain open and provide at least a technically adequate 
forum). 
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merely channeling certain cases of high value into federal court.  
Diversity jurisdiction would give the federal court authority to resolve 
tort claims of a high value, precisely the large dollar cases that are barred 
by the jurisdictional limits on non-pecuniary damages.  This result 
parallels other federal statutes, like the federal class action statute, that 
seemingly woo state tort plaintiffs into federal court.49  There is certainly 
a question as to whether the federalization of tort law is a desired result, 
and others have suggested that the move to federal court threatens 
certain democratic values.50  Regardless of the normative conclusion as 
to whether tort claims should be litigated in federal court, practically 
speaking, there will be few cases that satisfy this option.  Only a small 
group of tort cases would satisfy the requirement of the diversity of 
parties.  For routine tort cases, like medical malpractice or automobile 
accidents, it is more likely that diversity of citizenship will not be 
shown, thus confining the case to state court. 
Even if some tort cases are brought in federal court, there is a 
question as to whether state or federal law would apply to the choice of 
remedial law.51  The Supreme Court has been schizophrenic in its 
holdings on this matter.52  In some cases, it has held that the state 
remedial law applies as a substantive rule.53  In others, it has held that 
the federal remedial law applies as a rule of procedure.54  However, in 
looking at the holdings of cases that are most aligned with tort limits on 
non-pecuniary damages, the conclusion is likely that the state law of 
damages would apply to the state tort claim.55  If the state law of 
damages is applied to the diversity case in federal court, then the choice 
of a federal forum has no impact on the limitation of damages.  The state 
law capping the damages would still apply, prohibiting an award in 
excess of the set amount. 
 
 49. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b); Securities Litigation 
Uniform Standards Act of 1997, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p & 78bb. 
 50. JoEllen Lind, Complex Litigation Reform, State Tort Law, and Democratic Values, 37 
AKRON L. REV. 717 (2004); Georgene M. Vairo, Is Forum Shopping Unethical?, LOY. LAWYER 4 
(2005) (removal of cases to federal court to prevent state courts from providing relief for state law 
claims “raises serious federalism problems”); see also, Robert M. Ackerman, Tort Law and 
Federalism: Whatever Happened to Devotion?, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 429 (1996). 
 51. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 52. Thomas, Remedial Rights, supra note 4, at 685-86. 
 53. Gasperini v. Ctr for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 426 (1996); Chambers v. NASCO, 501 
U.S. 32, 52 (1991); Monessen S.W. Ry. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330, 335-36 (1988); Guaranty Trust 
Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 112 (1945). 
 54. Grupo Mexicano Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 319 n.3 (1999); 
Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 3 (1987). 
 55. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 416 (excessive compensatory damages); Monessen, 486 U.S. at 
335 (prejudgment interest). 
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The conclusion of the Erie problem thus illustrates that the tort 
reform statutes are not operating to channel the tort cases into federal 
court.  As such, they are not, in fact, jurisdictional statutes.  Rather, they 
are substantive changes in the law operating to prohibit certain factual 
decisions on the merits of the damages award.  It is an abuse of the 
legislative prerogative to use jurisdiction and remedies as simple 
expedients to deny the existence of a right.56  Such arbitrary legislative 
action is held in check by due process guarantees of the federal and state 
constitutions. 
II.  DUE PROCESS IMPLICATIONS IN THE RESTRICTION OF REMEDIES 
The due process theory advanced in this article argues that 
restricting the courts’ power to award an appropriate measure of 
damages arbitrarily denies prevailing plaintiffs their fundamental right to 
a meaningful remedy.  Grounded in notions of liberty rights to redress of 
wrongs and property rights, the due process analysis provides a check 
upon potentially improper legislative action that restricts remedies.  The 
judicial application of due process to tort reform laws is a routine 
counterbalancing of two branches of government that ensures legislative 
accountability to constitutional principles and ultimately the people.  
This traditional judicial function of constitutional oversight takes on 
even more importance in an age where scholars have challenged the 
assumption of the democratic, majoritarian legislature.57 
The due process theory of evaluating tort reform is built upon the 
recognition of the right to an adequate remedy as fundamental.58  There 
is a foundational principle in law that assumes a right to a remedy, 
embodied in the maxim ubi jus, ibi remedium (where there is a right, 
there must be a remedy).59  Whether this right is “fundamental” turns 
 
 56. “The General Assembly may not gain the authority to take away a constitutional right by 
the simple expedient of limiting the jurisdiction of the courts to the parameters of its own 
unconstitutional Act.”  Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1094 (Ohio 
1999). 
 57. Terri Peretti, An Empirical Analysis of Alexander Bickel’s The Least Dangerous Branch, 
in THE JUDICIARY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE 
COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY, AND CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 123, 125-
30 (Kenneth D. Ward & Cecilia R. Castillo, eds. 2005) (arguing that the dominance of interest 
politics and the influence of corporate interests challenges the notion that legislature effectuates the 
popular will and that the judiciary, rather than the legislature, may ultimately work to ratify public 
preferences); see also Barry Friedman, The History of The Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part 
One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 337-38 (1998); Richard H. Pildes & 
Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and 
Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2128-43 (1990). 
 58. Thomas, Ubi Jus, supra note 4, at 1636-40. 
 59. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 23 (1978). 
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upon whether the right has been historically recognized or is central to 
the concept of ordered liberty.60  The historical recognition of the right to 
a remedy is evident in English common law which expressed the 
necessity of a remedy to vindicate a legal right.61  This recognition was 
incorporated into Marbury v. Madison, where the Supreme Court 
emphasized the need for “proper redress” for every injury.62  From this 
early time, state constitutions have adopted express guarantees of the 
right to a remedy, and three-fourths of the states now provide: “All 
courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, 
which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay.”63  
Moreover, remedies are central to the concept of ordered liberty because 
they define abstract rights by giving them meaning and effect in the real 
world.64  Without remedies, a legal right is “nothing more than advice or 
recommendation” and has no tangible impact upon real parties.65  A 
remedy is thus the integral part of every right that is necessary to the 
implementation of the rule of law. 
Recognizing the existence of a fundamental right to an adequate 
remedy alters the calculus by which courts should assess the legitimacy 
of state action restricting remedies.  It is no longer simply a question of 
the superficial reasonableness of the economic legislation.  Instead, a 
new significant interest is added to the constitutional calculus that 
requires a meaningful assessment of the state regulation.  The operation 
of a fundamental right demands a close tailoring between the legislation, 
a compelling state interest, and the resulting regulatory ends.66  Using a 
 
 60. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997). 
 61. Ashby v. White, (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 126 (K.B.); BLACKSTONE, supra note 59, at 23. 
 62. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163-66 (1803) (“It is a general and indisputable rule, that where 
there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that right is 
invaded . . . . [F]or it is a settled and invariable principle in the laws of England, that every right, 
when withheld, must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress.”). 
 63. See, e.g., UTAH CONST. art. I, § 11; OHIO CONST. art I, § 16; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13; 
David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1197, 1201 (1992) (stating that thirty-
nine states have right to remedy clauses); Shannon M. Roesler, Comment, The Kansas Remedy by 
Due Course of Law Provision: Defining a Right to a Remedy, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 655, 656-59 
(1999). 
 64. Thomas, Ubi Jus, supra note 4, at 1638-39; Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 
YALE L.J. 585, 587 (1983) (stating that remedies generally “give meaning to ideas” in order that 
they be “effective in the real world”). 
 65. THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 159 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 
1961); Donald H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforcement of Rights 
in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665, 678 n.73 (1987). 
 66. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) (noting that substantive due process “forbids the 
government to infringe certain ‘fundamental’ liberty interests, no matter what process is provided, 
unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest”). 
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due process rubric of strict scrutiny provides the depth of judicial 
scrutiny necessary to assess whether the legislative substitute remedy is 
in fact meaningful and adequate. 
Due process provides a preferred analytical alternative for 
evaluating tort reform legislation.67  In the past, most structural 
arguments for or against restriction of judicial remedies in tort reform 
have been framed as issues of separation of powers in which the 
legislative branch potentially usurps the power of the judiciary to redress 
harms.68  The due process rubric offers a more definitive command 
prohibiting arbitrary state action as compared to the shifting nuances of 
balancing the separation of powers.  Due process is an express 
actionable claim that creates a line relatively more clear than usurpation 
of governmental power.  Moreover, due process establishes an 
overarching framework for testing the legitimacy of remedy restrictions 
from both the legislative and judicial branches.69  Using a consistent 
theory for evaluating the adequacy of all judicial remedies against 
attempted abridgement streamlines the legal questions and provides a 
mechanism for considering all of the relevant individual and societal 
interests.70 
Scholars and courts have assumed that the complete denial of the 
right to a remedy through the use of jurisdictional restrictions would 
violate due process.71  “No one would contend that a law of a State, 
forbidding all redress by actions at law for injuries to property, would be 
upheld in the courts of the United States, for that would be to deprive 
one of his property without due process of law.”72  In cases over which 
 
 67. Professor John Goldberg offers a conceptually similar, yet analytically distinct argument.  
See John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law 
for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 525 (2005).  He argues for a procedural due process 
protection for the common law right of tort defined as a law of redress and grounded in the U.S. 
Constitution.  Id. at 613 n.426.  Applying his framework to non-pecuniary damages caps, Goldberg 
suggests that the caps might be valid because on their face they seem to “leave open a meaningful 
avenue of redress.”  Id. at 622. 
 68. Cf. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 352 n.3 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (noting that potential due process problems could be raised by congressional restriction of 
remedy, but since “the constitutional question inherent in these possible circumstances does not 
seem to be squarely addressed by any of our cases,” assessing the constitutional issue as one of 
separation of powers). 
 69. See Thomas, Ubi Jus, supra note 4, at 1640-45 (arguing that judicial denial of adequate 
relief should be subject to strict scrutiny under due process). 
 70. See Condemarin v. Univ. Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 358 (Utah 1989). 
 71. Weiman, supra note 9, at 28; Young, supra note 42, at 134-35; see, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 
486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (interpreting statute so as not to exclude review of all constitutional 
claims, as the denial of any judicial relief would “raise serious constitutional questions.”); see also 
supra notes 70-72. 
 72. Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 303 (1884). 
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the state courts have no judicial power, such as suits against federal 
officials or habeas petitions for prisoners in federal custody, due process 
concerns likely prevent curtailment of federal court jurisdiction because 
no court would remain to hear the claim.73  Professor Henry Hart argued 
a century ago in his seminal article that Congress cannot eliminate all 
judicial authority to afford any remedy for constitutional rights.74 To 
afford Congress the power to deny any remedy would “turn a mere 
power to regulate jurisdiction into a power to affect rights having 
nothing to do with jurisdiction,” and the power to regulate jurisdiction 
cannot be exercised in a way that would violate other provisions of the 
Constitution.75 
The tort reform statutes, however, present a different question since 
they selectively restrict, rather than eliminate, remedies for common-law 
claims. When analyzing selective restrictions on remedies at the federal 
level, Hart and others asserted that such a jurisdictional limitation on 
remedies raises no constitutional issue, as long as some remedy 
remains.76  Hart distinguished between constitutional rights, which had 
some ultimate protection against abrogation, and statutory rights, which 
fell fully into the legislative prerogative.77  “In Hart’s view, this power to 
select among alternative remedies is true to the Madisonian Compromise 
between the need to protect the supremacy of the Constitution and its 
guaranteed rights and the need to subject the power of the judiciary to 
meaningful political control.”78 
Hart’s dialectic has been followed in the context of tort reform.  For 
example, in Etheridge v. Medical Center Hospitals, the Virginia 
Supreme Court held that the statutory cap on recoverable damages in a 
medical malpractice action did not violate substantive due process 
because of the availability of alternate remedies.79 
A party has no fundamental right to a particular remedy or a full 
recovery in tort. A statutory limitation on recovery is simply an 
 
 73. Weinberg, supra note 48, at 1423; see 142 CONG. REC. S2285-02, at S2297 (daily ed. 
Mar. 19, 1996) (statement of Associate Attorney General John Schmidt on the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act testifying that absolute prohibition on structural injunctions in prisoner conditions cases 
raises due process problems where such prohibitions would apply in both federal and state court). 
 74. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal 
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953). 
 75. Id. at 1372. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 1372; see also Thomas, Remedial Rights, supra note 4 (distinguishing Congress’ 
power to restrict remedies for statutory rights from its power to restrict remedies for constitutional 
rights). 
 78. Anderson, supra note 6, at 423-24.  
 79. 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989). 
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economic regulation, which is entitled to wide judicial deference. . . . 
More to the point, the legislature has the power to provide, modify, or 
repeal a remedy.  Virginia alone can prescribe the jurisdiction of her 
own courts.  She can mould her remedies as she pleases. . . . She may 
be bound to provide some remedy for wrong, but she is the exclusive 
and sovereign judge of the form of the remedy.80 
Thus, the mere existence of some alternative remedy remaining after the 
state regulation has been deemed by some courts as sufficient to satisfy 
due process. 
The mere designation of an alternative remedy, however, does not 
guarantee tangible redress for a legal wrong. 
Commentators consistently promote a system of “substitutability” of 
remedies and the Court regularly invokes the alternative remedy 
rationale when it refuses requested remedial measures.  Over the years, 
however, as the full scope of remedial limitations has unfolded, the 
notion of alternatives or substitutes that can effectively serve the 
purpose of the principal remedy that has been foreclosed, has the 
appearance of a “shell game.”  Alternatives are promised, but they are 
often denied, unavailable in practice, or riddled with exceptions that 
seriously undermine their effectiveness. . . . Remedies have been 
restricted on the theory that other remedies would be available, but in 
too many cases the Court has failed to adjust the remedial scheme to 
ensure the viability of this substitution process.81 
In the absence of judicial inquiry into the merits of the remaining relief, 
the plaintiff is not assured the minimum protection of the laws. 
III.  ADEQUACY AS A REQUIREMENT OF JUDICIAL RELIEF 
An examination of legal history and judicial precedent in the state 
and federal supreme courts supports the theory recognizing a 
fundamental right to an adequate remedy protected by due process.  
Tracing cases from 1845 to the present uncovers a solid foundation for 
the right to an adequate remedy protected against legislative 
abridgement.  The cases define “adequacy” as an individualized inquiry 
requiring meaningful benefit to the particular plaintiff.82  In addition, 
 
 80. Id. at 531. 
 81. Rudovsky, supra note 5, at 1212-13, 1254. 
 82. See, e.g., Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 690-91 (Tex. 1988) (stating that 
required quid pro quo for tort reform restriction cannot be established by benefits to society 
generally, but rather requires benefit to individual plaintiff); Kan. Malpractice Victims Coal. v. Bell, 
757 P.2d 251, 264 (Kan. 1988) (holding that legislative caps on damages were inadequate because 
they treated every injury identically and denied all remedy for plaintiff’s real losses exceeding the 
cap), overruled by Blair v. Peck, 811 P.2d 1176 (Kan. 1991). 
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“adequacy” is a comparative term defined as that which is equally as 
effective at redressing harm as the preexisting common law relief.83  
Incorporating this requirement of adequacy into the existing framework 
of remedial substitutability ensures that judicial remedies retain real 
meaning to plaintiffs, while legislatures tinker with alternative solutions 
to legal problems. 
State court decisions assessing tort reform laws have adopted the 
requirement of adequacy to qualify the legislature’s assumed prerogative 
of selecting remedies.  Grounding their decisions in state constitutional 
guarantees of the right to a remedy, these courts have required that the 
legislature provide an adequate alternative remedy.84  “The court looks 
to insure that due process requirements are met, and when a common-
law remedy is modified or abolished, an adequate substitute remedy 
must be provided to replace it.”85  For a right to a remedy “cannot be 
watered down by diluting the definition of remedy.”86 
Accordingly, tort reform statutes that cap damages have been held 
to violate constitutional remedial guarantees where they provide no 
alternative remedy or commensurate benefit to the plaintiff.87  For 
example, in Kansas Malpractice Victims v. Bell, the Kansas Supreme 
Court probed into the adequacy of legislative tort remedies, searching 
for an adequate and viable substitute to satisfy due process.88  
“[S]tatutory modification of the common law must meet due process 
 
 83. See infra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.  E.g. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 
(1980); Middleton v. Tex. Power & Light Co., 249 U.S. 152, 163 (1919) (upholding legislative 
remedial substitutes as adequate because they did not dramatically differ from the compensation 
available at common law); Judd v. Drezga, 103 P.3d 135, 139 (Utah 2004) (stating that benefit 
provided by legislative remedial substitute must be substantially equal in value or benefit to the 
remedy abrogated). 
 84. See Sorrell v. Thevenir, 633 N.E.2d 504, 513 (Ohio 1994) (interpreting state constitutional 
guarantee of remedy as encompassing the fundamental right to a “meaningful remedy” that provides 
satisfaction for injuries sustained); Bell, 757 P.2d at 259, 264 ; Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 691; Hardy v. 
VerMeulen, 512 N.E.2d 626, 631 (Ohio 1987) (Douglas, J., concurring) (explaining that the gist of 
a right to a remedy violation is the absence of a reasonable alternative remedy); Smith v. Dep’t of 
Ins., 507 So.2d 1080 (Fla. 1987) (holding damage cap invalid under right of access to the courts 
because it provided no alternative remedy or commensurate benefit to the plaintiff). Cf. Judd, 103 
P.3d at 139 (holding that legislature failed to provide an adequate substitute remedy, but sustaining 
the inadequate remedy against constitutional challenge). 
 85. Bell, 757 P.2d at 260. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. (striking down tort reform statute capping damages in medical malpractice actions at 
$250,000 for noneconomic damages and 1 million for aggregate damages); but see Samsel v. 
Wheeler Transp. Servs. Inc., 789 P.2d 541, 557-58 (Kan. 1990) (overturning decision in Bell and 
finding adequate quid pro quo provided by revised tort reform law interpreted to preclude all 
remittiturs below the statutory cap of $250,000); Lucas, 757 S.W.2d. at 691; Smith, 507 So.2d 1080; 
cf. Judd, 103 P.3d at 148 (Durham, J., dissenting). 
 88. Bell, 757 P.2d at 259. 
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requirements . . .  Due process requires that the legislative means 
selected have a real and substantial relation to the objective sought.  One 
way to meet due process requirements is through substitute remedies.”89  
Kansas focuses its adequate substitute requirement upon the existence of 
a “quid pro quo” that provides the plaintiff with some benefit in 
exchange for the retraction of a common-law remedy.90  Applying this 
standard in Bell, the Kansas Court held that the substitute remedies 
provided by the legislative cap on damages was inadequate because it 
treats every injury identically, denies all remedy for real losses 
exceeding the cap, and removes “a substantial right of the plaintiff and 
gives him nothing in return.”91 
More recently, the Utah Supreme Court applied a similar standard 
of an adequate substitute remedy in evaluating its tort reform 
legislation.92 The right to a remedy, the Court held, is satisfied “if the 
law provides an injured person an effective and reasonable alternative 
remedy ‘by due course of law’ for vindication of his constitutional 
interest.  The benefit provided by the substitute must be substantially 
equal in value or other benefit to the remedy abrogated.”93  Utah thus 
looks for a substitute remedy of equal or additional value to provide the 
quid pro quo necessitated by the abridgment of the right to a remedy.94  
Accordingly, in Judd v. Drezga, the court held that the mandated 
adequate remedy was not found in the legislature’s cap on quality of life 
damages.95 
The question of whether tort reform caps on damages violate due 
process by providing an inadequate substitute remedy was presented to 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Fein v. Permanente Medical Group; 
however, the Court denied certiorari.96  In Fein, the California Supreme 
Court upheld a cap on non-economic damages in medical malpractice 
cases against a due process challenge.97  In dissenting from the denial of 
certiorari, Justice White argued that the question of whether due process 
required adequate relief in the tort context was of utmost importance. 
Whether due process requires a legislatively enacted compensation 
scheme to be a quid pro quo for the common-law or state-law remedy 
 
 89. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 90. Id. at 258. 
 91. Id. at 264. 
 92. Judd, 103 P.3d at 139. 
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. at 139, 148. 
 95. Id. at 138. 
 96. 474 U.S. 892 (1985). 
 97. 695 P.2d 665, 680 (Cal. 1985). 
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it replaces, and if so, how adequate it must be, thus appears to be an 
issue unresolved by this Court, and one which is dividing the appellate 
and highest courts of several States. The issue is important, and is 
deserving of this Court’s review. Moreover, given the continued 
national concern over the “malpractice crisis,” it is likely that more 
States will enact similar types of limitations, and that the issue will 
recur. I find, therefore, that the federal question presented by this 
appeal is substantial, and dissent from the Court’s conclusion to the 
contrary.98 
Previously, the Supreme Court had upheld a congressional restriction on 
recoverable damages for nuclear accidents in Duke Power v. Carolina 
Environmental Study Group Inc.99  While declining to hold expressly 
that an adequate substitute remedy was required by due process, the 
Court went to great lengths to explain how the Price-Anderson Act did 
in fact provide a “reasonably just substitute” for the common-law state 
remedies that it replaced.100  The Court highlighted the legislative 
assurances of certain recovery from a designated fund and the mandatory 
waiver of defenses leading to no-fault liability as ample quid pro quo for 
the uncertainty of liability and recovery under common law.101 
The requirement of an adequate substitute remedy finds support in 
earlier U.S. Supreme Court cases beginning in the nineteenth century.  In 
1845, Justice Story, dissenting in Cary v. Curtis, found the use of 
jurisdiction to deprive a plaintiff of an adequate remedy to be 
problematic.102 In Cary, the majority upheld a congressional 
jurisdictional statute barring the common-law remedy of restitution 
against a customs tax collector.103  The majority reasoned that Congress 
had the power to limit the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, and 
emphasized the availability of alternative remedies in Hart-like 
fashion.104  Justice Story, however, delved into the merits of the 
substitute legislative remedy, finding it inadequate: “[W]hat ground is 
there to suppose that Congress could intend to take away so important 
and valuable a remedy, and leave our citizens utterly without any 
adequate protection?”105  Story found the alternative remedies identified 
by the majority (appealing to the executive’s discretion for repayment or 
 
 98. Fein, 474 U.S. at 894-95 (White, J., dissenting). 
 99. 438 U.S. 59 (1978). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. 44 U.S. 236, 254 (1845) (Story, J., dissenting). 
 103. Id. at 252. 
 104. Id. at 250; see Anderson, supra note 6. 
 105. 44 U.S. at 255. 
118 AKRON LAW REVIEW  
refusing to pay the tax) to be circuitous and impractical.106  The total 
elimination of one type of restitution remedy by the use of a 
jurisdictional statute was, for Story, a misuse of judicial power. 
Justice Story’s approach of inquiring into the adequacy of the 
remedial substitute was adopted by the Supreme Court in a series of 
cases in the early twentieth century challenging economic legislation 
after the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment.107  In these cases, the 
Court assessed the reasonableness of the legislative substitute remedy by 
determining whether it substantially departed from the common-law 
approach.108  For example, in Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Humes, 
the defendant challenged a statutory double damages multiplier for 
harms to livestock caused by railroads.109  A unanimous Court upheld 
the double damages provision because it approximated a possible 
remedy at common law since the jury had discretion to award damages 
above pecuniary loss.110  A second example is seen in the workers’ 
compensation cases evaluating laws that precluded employees from 
seeking tort compensation for workplace injuries.111  The Court 
sustained the legislative substitutes against due process challenge finding 
the regulation adequate because it did not dramatically differ from the 
compensation available at common law.112  In addition, the Court, like 
state courts in the quid pro quo cases, found that the legislature provided 
an additional benefit to plaintiffs in easier liability rules and scheduled 
damages.113 
The rule of “adequate relief” as a standard for testing the 
constitutionality of a substitute remedy finds additional support in 
modern taxpayer cases in the Supreme Court.114  In these cases, the 
Court found a denial of due process where prevailing plaintiffs were 
denied meaningful and adequate remedies for a proven violation.115  
While courts have flexibility to choose among appropriate equitable and 
 
 106. Id. at 256. 
 107. See Goldberg, supra note 67, at 568-72. 
 108. Id.  
 109. 115 U.S. 512 (1885). 
 110. Id. at 523. 
 111. Middleton v. Tex. Power & Light Co., 249 U.S. 152, 163 (1919); New York Central R.R. 
v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201 (1917). 
 112. Middleton, 249 U.S. at 163; White, 243 U.S. at 202; see Goldberg, supra note 67, at 573-
74. 
 113. Middleton, 249 U.S. at 163; White, 243 U.S. at 202; see Goldberg, supra note 67, at 573-
74. 
 114. Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 109 (1994); Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 
101-02 (1993); McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 39 
(1990). 
 115. Thomas, Ubi Jus, supra note 4, at 1641. 
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monetary remedies, they cannot, consistent with due process, select a 
remedy that fails to provide meaningful relief to the individual 
plaintiff.116  The mere availability of alternative remedies did not 
insulate the denial of damages from constitutional infirmity. 
The Supreme Court’s cases on civil rights remedies continue this 
pattern of focusing on the adequacy of the legislative substitute 
remedy.117  In these cases, the Court asks whether the legislative 
substitute is equally effective at protecting the constitutional right as the 
judicial remedy.118  The civil rights cases, like the historical economic 
legislation cases, engage in a comparison between the preexisting 
judicial remedy and the legislative substitute.  The nature of this 
comparison, however, differs significantly based on the existence of a 
constitutional fundamental right.119  The interplay of a fundamental right 
mandates an “equally effective” remedy that provides an individualized 
remedy that achieves the remedial goal at least as well as the judicial 
remedy.  For example, in Carlson v. Green, the Court held that a 
restriction of mental distress damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act 
failed to provide an equally effective remedy for an individual plaintiff’s 
Eighth Amendment claims as the non-pecuniary damages available as a 
remedy in federal court.120 
Requiring an adequate substitute remedy is therefore the threshold 
question in a constitutional challenge to remedy restrictions under due 
process.  Courts would first inquire as to the existence of an adequate 
substitute remedy in order to determine whether the legislation 
 
 116. Id.  See Harper, 509 U.S. at 102 (“[Virginia] is free to choose which form of relief it will 
provide, so long as that relief satisfies the minimum federal requirements we have outlined.  State 
law may provide relief beyond the demands of federal due process, but under non circumstances 
may it confine petitioners to a lesser remedy.”). 
 117. Thomas, Remedial Rights, supra note 4, at 756-66.  E.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 
U.S. 428 (2000) (striking congressional remedy for a Miranda violation finding it not “as equally as 
effective” in protecting the constitutional right as the judicial prophylactic remedy of mandatory 
advanced warnings); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (invalidating the Federal Tort Claims 
Act’s prohibition of mental distress damages for prisoner civil rights claims because the legislative 
remedy was not as effective at protecting constitutional rights as the judicial remedy). 
 118. Thomas, Remedial Rights, supra note 4, at 756-66. 
 119. Where remedies for statutory rights are restricted, legislatures are less likely to run into 
due process problems since legislatures have the power to create or eviscerate the very right itself, 
and thus can accomplish that same result via a remedy restriction.  Thomas, Remedial Rights, supra 
note 4, at 742-43.  Constitutional rights, and common-law rights, however, differ in their creation 
independent of the legislature and in their significance for the rule of law.  See Walter Dellinger, Of 
Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1534 (1972); 
Goldberg, supra note 67, at 529 (finding a constitutional basis for the common-law tort right to 
redress). 
 120. 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
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significantly burdens the fundamental remedial right.121  In the tort 
reform context, the Utah Supreme Court found without question that 
damages caps constituted an inadequate substitute.  “It is self-evident 
that the cap on the quality of life damages, which does nothing more 
than reduce [plaintiff]’s recovery, does not provide a substitute remedy 
substantially equal to that abrogated.”122  In the absence of an adequate 
substitute, the state interference with the right to a remedy would be 
subjected to rigorous judicial scrutiny.123  However, where courts find an 
adequate substitute remedy, as in the cases where a new benefit or quid 
pro quo is available, the legislative remedy is sufficient and no further 
judicial scrutiny is required.124 
IV.  CHANGING BUSINESS AS USUAL IN ECONOMIC DUE PROCESS CASES 
Explicitly recognizing the fundamental right to a remedy 
significantly alters the existing framework from which courts have 
reviewed challenges to tort reform statutes.  Most state courts analyzing 
due process challenges to tort reform statutes have scrutinized this social 
and economic legislation under a rational basis standard.125  Finding that 
the legislation bears some rational connection to plausible social and 
economic goals, the courts have upheld the statutes against challenge.126 
 
 121. Judd, 103 P.3d at 139 (finding as threshold question that cap on quality of life damages 
did not provide substitute remedy substantially equal to that provided by the common law). 
 122. Id. 
 123. An analytical parallel to this framework can be drawn from the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
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434 U.S. 374 (1978).  The Court first asks whether the legislation burdens the fundamental right by 
“significantly interfering” with the right to marry. Id. at 381.  Only where significant interference is 
found will the Court subject the regulation to strict scrutiny; otherwise, laws are reviewed under 
rational basis.  Id. at 386; see Moe v. Dinkins, 533 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d, 669 F.2d 67 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 827 (1982); see also Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 
U.S. 398, 442-43 (1934) (delaying mortgage holder’s right to repossession during Depression did 
not deny right to a remedy). 
 124. See, e.g., Johnson v. Saint Vincent Hosp., 404 N.E.2d 585, 601 (Ind. 1980); Sibley v. Bd. 
of Supervisors, 477 So.2d 1094 (1988); Butler v. Flint Goodridge Hosp., 607 So.2d 517, 521 (La. 
1992) (finding quid pro quo benefit provided in tort reform statute capping non-pecuniary damages 
where statute assured continuation of viable medical malpractice insurance industry).  But see Bell, 
757 P.2d at 259, 264 (holding that continuing medical malpractice insurance was not a new benefit 
to the plaintiff achieved by the tort reform statute itself). 
 125. See e.g., Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corp., 704 F. Supp. 1325, 1337 (D. Md. 1989); Judd, 
103 P.3d at 143; Peters v. Saft, 597 A.2d 50, 53 (Me. 1991); Fein v. Permanente Group, 695 P.2d 
665, 680 (Cal. 1985); Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 691.  See Light, supra note 9, at 319 (“[D]ue 
process . . . analyses all rest upon rational basis review.”); Carly Kelly & Michelle Mello, Are 
Medical Malpractice Caps Constitutional? An Overview of State Litigation, 33 J. MED. L. & ETHICS 
515, 516 (2005) (“We conclude that damages caps passed as a response to documented strains in the 
liability insurance market are generally upheld against constitutional challenges. . . .”). 
 126. Judd, 103 P.3d at 139-42; Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Servs. of Richmond, Inc., 509 
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Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court has adopted a minimal scrutiny 
standard for reviewing economic legislation challenged under due 
process grounds.  In cases decided soon after the enactment of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court reviewed economic legislation in due 
process cases under a deferential standard, upholding state laws that 
provided reasonably adequate remedies.  Then for over forty years 
during the Lochner era, the Court struck down over 200 economic 
regulations on due process grounds under a higher standard of scrutiny 
on grounds that they interfered with a liberty of contract.127  Strong 
rejection of Lochner beginning with the New Deal era led the Court to 
abandon even the nineteenth-century minimal inquiry of adequacy and 
in its place adopt a “strategy of extreme deference to the legislature in 
economic due process cases.”128 
The Court proclaimed in one opinion, “So far as the requirement of 
due process is concerned, . . . a state is free to adopt whatever 
economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public 
welfare . . . . Under this approach, . . . state laws were granted a 
presumption of constitutionality that could be overcome only by 
showing them to be clearly irrational or unreasonable.  In other words, 
minimal judicial scrutiny became the Court’s modus operandi in cases 
involving economic legislation challenged as violative of the Due 
Process Clause. 
Minimal scrutiny, however, is something of a misnomer. In fact, 
minimal scrutiny is so deferential as to be virtually nonexistent.  In 
economic due process cases, then, where minimal scrutiny is operative, 
the Court functions as a rubber stamp for statutory enactments, 
abandoning all oversight of the legislature. As a result, in cases 
involving economic legislation the Due Process Clause has no 
efficacy.129 
 After 1937, “Lochnerism” became shorthand for judicial activism 
and improper judicial review of state regulation.130  However, the 
 
S.E.2d 307, 318 (Va. 1999).  But see Lucas, 757 S.W.2d 687 (striking down damages cap under 
rational basis review of due process challenge); Ferdon ex rel. Petrucelli v. Wis. Patients 
Compensation Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440 (Wis. 2005) (striking down cap on non-economic damages 
for medical malpractice cases under rational basis “with teeth” review in equal protection 
challenge). 
 127. Jeffrey M. Shaman, On the 100th Anniversary of Lochner, 72 TENN. L. REV. 455, 496 
(2005).  In Lochner v. New York, the Court struck down a maximum hour law for New York bakers 
on due process grounds holding that the state’s regulation impermissibly interfered with the bakers’ 
fundamental liberty to contract.  198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 128. Shaman, supra note 127, at 491. 
 129. Id. at 491-92. 
 130. See Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”: Lochner and Constitutional 
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problem with Lochner is not its use of heightened review under 
substantive due process.131  Rather, Lochner’s invalidity stems primarily 
from its now-discredited recognition of a fundamental liberty of 
contract.132  The Court’s substitution of its own laissez-faire economic 
agenda for the protective interests of the New York legislature, and the 
Court’s refusal to test the legitimacy of the legislature’s motivations 
against empirical evidence and data, fueled the criticism of the decision 
that led to a constitutional crisis.133  Yet even the dissenting Justice 
Harlan applied a strict scrutiny standard using alternative economic 
assumptions and factual information submitted in the case to uphold the 
New York maximum hour law for bakers.134  Harlan’s application of 
strict scrutiny that challenges pretextual legislative motives and demands 
empirical and factual support for legislation is precisely the standard of 
judicial review advanced here. 
Some have argued that the Supreme Court may have “overreacted” 
to Lochner and its political fallout by abandoning exacting due process 
review for all economic legislation.135  The Court certainly has not 
abandoned substantive due process review in whole.  Indeed, substantive 
due process review under a heightened standard has flourished under the 
Court’s privacy cases.136  This use of substantive due process to 
challenge state regulation is alive and well, and lends support to the use 
of heightened analysis for fundamental remedial rights.137 
 
Historicism, 85 B.U. L. Rev. 677 (2005); George L. Priest, The Constitutionality of State Tort 
Reform Measures and Lochner, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 683 (2001) (arguing against a Lochner-like 
approach to evaluating tort reform and advocating an economic efficiency driven approach). 
 131. Balkin, supra note 130, at 678; Shaman, supra note 127, at 491 (summarizing arguments 
to this effect).  See David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins 
of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L. J. 1, 12 (2003) (arguing for a renewed focus 
on Lochner’s primary jurisprudential importance as an originator of constitutional analysis of 
fundamental liberties). 
 132. Shaman, supra note 127, at 491. 
 133. Balkin, supra note 130, at 686; Shaman, supra note 127, at 592 (citing Williamson v. Lee 
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) and its holding that “the day is gone when this Court uses the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business 
and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a 
particular school of thought” and Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 246 (1941), “We are not 
concerned . . . with the wisdom, need, or appropriateness of the legislation.”). 
 134. Shaman, supra note 127.  The Court’s continued invalidation of legislation for economic 
and labor protections enacted during the Depression led President Franklin Roosevelt to threaten the 
Court with his plan of expanding the Court to fifteen justices and mandating retirement for senior 
Justices.  Id. at 497. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 499. 
 137. Bernstein, supra note 131, at 12; Robert Riggs, Constitutionalizing Punitive Damages: 
The Limits of Due Process, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 859, 869 (1991) (“Substantive due process thus 
continues alive and well, although its application to punitive damages appears to have much more in 
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Moreover, the Court has signaled a return to substantive review of 
economic regulation in the punitive damages cases.138  In these cases, 
BMW v. Gore139 and State Farm v. Campbell,140 the Court has adopted a 
heightened standard of scrutiny to review the award of punitive damages 
under state law.  The protection of a fundamental property right to 
money damages has justified the adoption of a heightened review of the 
challenged remedy.  In assessing the arbitrariness of punitive damages 
awards under the Due Process Clause, the Court has adopted a 
demanding standard of scrutiny that requires that the interest served by 
the judicial action be compelling in light of the reprehensibility of the 
defendants’ conduct and that it be narrowly tailored to the amount of 
compensatory damages and regulatory sanctions.141  Extending this 
heightened scrutiny of punitive damages to the related tort issue of non-
pecuniary damages is a small stretch, regardless of whether the courts 
are evaluating arbitrariness at the ceiling or floor of relief.142 
The strict scrutiny calculus as applied to the remedial jurisdiction 
stripping statutes, and tort remedy restrictions in general, would demand 
compelling state interests for the remedial restrictions that were 
accomplished through the least restrictive legislative alternative.143  In 
the few cases that have subjected tort reform statutes to heightened 
scrutiny in the past, the legislation has been struck down.144  Tort reform 
damages caps have also been invalidated by state courts applying an 
 
common with the old economic substantive due process, now largely disavowed, than with the new 
substantive due process of privacy and fundamental rights.”). 
 138. Mark Geistfeld, Constitutional Tort Reform, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1093, 1093-94 (2005) 
(endorsing expanded substantive due process review beyond punitive damages to all tort damages); 
Shaman, supra note 127, at 501-02 (“A majority of the Court, then, appears willing to revive 
economic substantive due process review in this specialized area of the law that overlaps with 
procedural concerns.”). 
 139. BMW of N. Am. Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 140. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 141. Other scholars have agreed with an expanded use of the economic due process analysis in 
the context of tort damages, but have sought to achieve a judicial ceiling rather than a minimum 
flooring for arbitrary awards.  Geistfeld, supra note 138, at 1107-08; Paul DeCamp, Beyond State 
Farm: Due Process Constraints on Noneconomic Compensatory Damages, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 231 (2003). 
 142. See DeCamp, supra note 141; see also State Farm, 538 U.S. at 416 (discussing close 
parallel between noneconomic and punitive damages). 
 143. Cf. Ferdon ex rel. Petrucelli v. Wis. Patients Compensation Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440, 456 
(Wis. 2005)  (stating that, if strict scrutiny applied in that case, that the Defendant would have the 
burden of proving that the statutory “cap on noneconomic damages . . . promotes a compelling 
governmental interest and that it is the least restrictive means for doing so”) 
 144. Kenyon v. Hammer, 688 P.2d 961 (1984); Bell, 757 P.2d at 259; Morris, 576 N.E.2d at 
780-81 (Sweeney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (applying strict scrutiny to invalidate 
damages cap). 
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intermediate level of scrutiny.145  These courts have found the 
importance, but not the fundamentality, of the right to a remedy to merit 
more judicial scrutiny than the usual deferential review.  This 
application of a heightened standard does not mean the per se 
invalidation of tort reform remedy restrictions; instead, it requires more 
reasoned justification from the legislature than currently exists.146 
Under strict scrutiny, the state bears a more significant burden in 
justifying its economic legislation with a compelling, rather than 
superficially rational interest.147  The Court will delve more closely into 
the interests asserted for the legislation to determinewhether they are 
meritorious or pretextual.148  It will no longer be possible for the state to 
rely upon “common sense” to justify its economic legislation.149  Rather 
than merely giving the state carte blanche to legislate, the court will 
inquire as to the credibility of the asserted economic interest.150  
Certainly many have discredited the asserted state interests of tort reform 
that purport to solve the problem of the litigation explosion, the runaway 
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“Common Sense Legislation”: The Birth of Neoclassic Tort Reform, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1769 
(1996); see also Benjamin H. Davidson, et. al., Texas Statutory Caps and Settlement Credits After 
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 150. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 689 (1973) (searching for “concrete evidence” to 
support the government’s “questionable” explanation of its statutory scheme in strict scrutiny 
analysis under due process). 
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juries, or the insurance crisis.151  Moreover, it could be argued that the 
legislative interests of protecting big business and repeat wrongdoers 
from accepting the externalities of their illegal actions fails to meet the 
compelling interest standard.152 
Under the second prong of a strict scrutiny analysis, courts would 
examine tort reform legislation to ensure that the statutes are sufficiently 
tailored or connected to the compelling interest.  Courts applying 
heightened scrutiny to tort reform statutes in the past have struck down 
laws that are underinclusive by forcing only the most severely injured 
victims to bear the full social responsibility of insuring health care.153  It 
could also be argued that the tailoring connection is not met by imposing 
penalties for frivolous lawsuits on prevailing plaintiffs with meritorious 
claims.  Tailoring questions are also raised by the fact that total 
compensatory damages have risen despite the non-economic caps, and 
by suggestions that these increases in economic damages may be 
exacerbated by the enactment of non-economic damages caps.154  In 
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on the other hand, in the same statute, to reward negligent health care providers.  A cap 
on noneconomic damages diminishes tort liability for health care providers and 
diminishes the deterrent effect of tort law. 
Id. at 464. 
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Id. 
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addition, it could be argued that capping damages is not the “least 
restrictive alternative.”  Capping damages for all tort plaintiffs appears 
overly broad and as compared to narrower limitations on damages that 
are excessive, unsupported by the evidence, or significantly out of line 
with similar awards.155  This more demanding tailoring is necessitated by 
the involvement of a fundamental right to an adequate remedy. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
A stricter standard of scrutiny for tort reform statutes holds 
legislatures accountable for their actions.  It blocks attempts to 
circumvent public scrutiny through the evasive technique of remedies 
stripping.  Legislatures are required to provide sound reasons for their 
economic decisionmaking that can be supported with reliable data and 
logical analysis.  The accountability and reliability achieved with the 
strict scrutiny standard directs states to legislate in a way that does not 
misuse remedies simply to accomplish political ends. 
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